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Deliberate killing is a common part of the defining features of both homicide and civil 
war. Often, the scale of killing is also similar: most countries have homicide rates that 
exceed the threshold of one thousand combat-related deaths during a year that is the 
standard criterion for civil war. What is clearly different is the organization of killing: the 
perpetrators of homicide are usually individuals or small groups, whereas rebellion – the 
direct cause of a civil war - requires a cohesive group of at least several hundred killers. 
Beyond this, the motivation for the two types of killing may differ systematically, 
although evidently both homicide and rebellion have many different motivations, 
including error and irrationality. 
 
In this paper we investigate whether the socio-economic determinants of homicide and 
civil war are similar, and then explore potential inter-relationships between them. We 
compare our existing model of the risk of civil war with a new model of the homicide 
rate. We find that there is a ‘family resemblance’ between the two types of killing, but 
surprising differences. Furthermore, we turn to the inter-relationships between homicide 
and the risk of civil war. Specifically, we ask whether a high rate of homicide makes a 
country more prone to civil war, and whether a civil war makes a country more prone to 
homicide. Our results indicate that higher homicide rate do not increase the risk of war 
but that civil wars generate a legacy of increased post-conflict homicide rates.   3 
1. Introduction  
Deliberate killing is a common part of the defining features of both homicide and civil 
war. Often, the scale of killing is also similar: most countries have homicide rates that 
exceed the threshold of one thousand combat-related deaths during a year that is the 
standard criterion for civil war. Indeed, for the 31 countries for which we have recent 
data, all have an annual number of murders that exceeds the civil war threshold. What is 
clearly different is the organization of killing: the perpetrators of homicide are usually 
individuals or small groups, whereas rebellion – the direct cause of a civil war -requires a 
cohesive group of at least several hundred killers. Beyond this, the motivation for the two 
types of killing may differ systematically, although evidently both homicide and rebellion 
have many different motivations, including error and irrationality.  
In this paper we first investigate whether the socio-economic determinants of homicide 
and civil war are similar, and then explore potential inter-relationships between them. In 
Section 2 we compare our existing model of the risk of civil war with a new model of the 
homicide rate. We find that there is a ‘family resemblance’ between the two types of 
killing, but surprising differences. In Section 3 we turn to the inter-relationships between 
homicide and the risk of civil war. Specifically, we ask whether a high rate of homicide 
makes a country more prone to civil war, and whether a civil war makes a country more 
prone to homicide. We also investigate whether Africa displays any distinctive patterns in 
these inter-relationships or simply conforms to global behaviour. Section 4 concludes.   4 
2. A Comparison of Causes  
In previous work (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) we have modeled the risk of civil war. 
Using global data for the period 1965-99 we find that the risk of civil war during a five-
year period is significantly related to a few socio-economic variables. The three most 
important variables are the level, growth, and structure of GDP. Higher per capita GDP 
and faster growth both substantially reduce the risk of civil war, whereas a higher share 
of primary commodities in GDP increases the risk except when primary commodity 
dependence becomes extreme. Social variables have little effect, except that if the largest 
ethnic group in a society constitutes a small majority of the population (‘ethnic 
dominance’), the risk of war is substantially increased. The list of variables that have no 
significant effect is quite striking: neither income inequality nor the degree of democratic 
rights have any effect, and ethnic and religious diversity is mildly beneficial, (other than 
for ethnic dominance). We now investigate whether the homicide rate is similarly 
determined.  
The causes of homicides have recently been studied by Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 
(2002a,b) – hereafter FLL - and Neumayer (2003). We first revisit the work by FLL, 
expand their data set and revise the explanatory variables according to the work by 
Neumayer (2003). FLL find that the explanation of homicide rates has a very different 
pattern to the explanation of civil wars – the level of GDP has no significant effect 
whereas income inequality is the most important explanatory variable. 
 
Panel data on homicides are available from three main sources: The United Nations 
(UN), the World Health Organization (WHO) and from the International Criminal Police   5 
Organization (Interpol). FLL (2002a) use as their main source UN Crime Surveys. In 
these surveys homicide is defined as 'death purposely inflicted by another person, 
including infanticide'. These data are only irregularly collected and an update was not 
available to us. We used mainly WHO data to update the data set because they are widely 
regarded as the most reliable (see for example La Free, 1999). The WHO provides data 
on deaths due to 'homicide and injury purposely inflicted by other persons', this 
information is based on death certificates issued by doctors. For countries for which 
WHO data were not available we used Interpol data. Homicides are measured as the 
homicide rate per 100,000 persons.  
In Table 1, column 1, we replicate FLL (2002a).
1
 
FLL use GMM estimation in their 
work, however they seem to report the results from the two step estimator which is 
unlikely to be the appropriate estimation technique for such a small sample (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). One possible estimation method is the use of a fixed effects estimator in 
order to take unobserved country specific effects into account. This method relies on the 
temporal variation of the explanatory variables only, which will cause a loss of efficiency 
if there is little variation over time. This is the case with many of our explanatory 
variables and the loss in efficiency is problematic. We therefore suggest the use of OLS 
estimation, taking heteroskedasticity into consideration by reporting White corrected 
standard errors. We tested for time effects but found them to be not significant. Using our 
updated data set we estimate the FLL model in column (2), our results are qualitatively 
similar.  
The most striking apparent difference between civil war and the homicide rate is that the 
                                                    
1 Their Table 1, column2.   6 
most important variable in the former – GDP – is insignificant in the latter. However, the 
lack of significance of GDP in the homicide rate is open to question. Along with GDP, 
FLL include among the explanatory variables both the lagged dependent variable and the 
GDP growth rate. Given this specification, even if the true relationship is that the levels 
of all the explanatory variables – including GDP – determine the homicide rate, the level 
of GDP and its growth cannot both be significant. The inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable is equivalent to using as the dependent variable the change in the homicide rate. 
The level of GDP can thus only be significant in the regression to the extent that is 
captures the change in GDP from the previous period, yet the inclusion of the growth rate 
as an explanatory variable preempts this possibility. It is, of course, entirely reasonable to 
suppose that the growth of GDP has an effect on the homicide rate over and above any 
effect of the level of GDP, but to investigate this the lagged dependent variable cannot be 
included. Once the lagged dependent variable is dropped, there is no longer such a strong 
case for the use of GMM, hence our switch to OLS. In the new regression (Table 1, 
column 3) the level of GDP becomes significant along with the rate of change. GDP and 
its growth have qualitatively the same effect on the homicide rate as they do on the risk of 
civil war: killing is higher in low-income countries in economic decline. Following 
Neumayer (2003) we also include democracy and the proportion of young men in our 
specification. Homicide rates are significantly higher in democracies. Neumayer (2003) 
finds that this effect diminishes at high levels of democracy. He includes a squared 
democracy term in his regressions and finds that the coefficient on this term is negative 
and significant. We cannot confirm this result and thus only include a linear democracy 
term. As Neumayer (2003) we find that countries with a high proportion of young men   7 
have higher homicide rates.  
Beyond this common core, however, there are differences. Our core regression of the risk 
of civil war finds the share of primary commodities in GDP, and ethnic dominance to be 
significant influences. Neither of these has a significant effect on the homicide rate 
(Table 1, columns 4 and 5). Conversely, our core regression for homicide (Table 1, 
column 3) finds three variables to be significant that are not included in our core model of 
the risk of civil war: inequality, democracy, and the proportion of young men in the 
population. Table 2, column 1, reproduces our core regression of the probability of an 
outbreak of civil war during a five-year period (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). In the 
columns 2, 3 and 4, we show that none of these variables is significant when added to the 
core regression.  
We now discuss what these similarities and differences might indicate. The common 
effect of low income and economic decline could proxy both the weakness of the state 
and the desperation of its citizens. That is, the formal restraints on murder might be 
atypically weak, and the lack of legitimate income-earning opportunities might propel 
people into violence whether individually or collectively.  
That inequality is significant for the homicide rate, while primary commodities are 
significant for the risk of civil war might indicate the different targets for individual and 
group violence. Individual violence might be targeting relatively high-income people, 
while to target the rents from primary commodities requires substantial organized 
violence. However, in many cases the victim and the murderer are drawn from the same 
socio-economic group. An alternative explanation for the importance of inequality is that,   8 
controlling for the mean level of per capita income, greater inequality is associated with 
increased poverty. Thus, the apparently common cause of targeted wealth for homicide 
and civil war may be illusory. The significance of the proportion of young men in the 
homicide rate but not in the risk of civil war may reflect the radically different degrees of 
organizational difficulty involved in individual and group killing. Young men, 
individually or in groups, evidently require no further organization to be able to kill 
individuals, but rebellion commonly requires a level of organization that may be beyond 
the reach of youth. Conversely, where there is a capacity to organize, finance and equip 
rebellion, the number of young men available may not be a binding constraint – in low-
income countries in decline there are always more than enough recruits. It is on the face 
of it surprising that democracy should reduce homicide but not the risk of civil war. Its 
effect on the homicide rate may reflect the rule of law: where the rule of law is weak 
people resort to individual violence. Its lack of effect on the risk of civil war may indicate 
both that in low-income countries democracy does not help to produce outcomes that are 
accepted as ‘fair’, and that rebellions are not in practice attempts to achieve ‘fairness’, but 
rather are merely attempts to increase the resources available for the rebel group. 
 
3. Inter-relations between Homicide and Civil War  
We now turn to inter-relations between the homicide rate and the risk of civil war. We 
first investigate whether the homicide rate has an effect on the risk of civil war. 
Potentially we might expect such an influence. A high homicide rate might both cause 
and reflect a desensitization of the society to violence, and thereby weaken the inhibitions   9 
to large-scale organized killing. In Table 2, column 5 we introduce the lagged homicide 
rate as an explanatory variable in the risk of civil war. The lag is necessary because 
otherwise we might pick up the reverse effect that when a civil war breaks out there is an 
effect on the homicide rate. The lagged variable is insignificant. Since the homicide rate 
is indeed likely to proxy the society’s general exposure to violence, this suggests that 
rebellion is unrelated to widespread attitudes to violence within society. One explanation 
for this is that rebel groups are usually extremely small relative to the population: the 
ability to recruit or coerce a few hundred youths into a rebel army may simply be 
unrelated to how the majority of people view violence.  
We next investigate whether civil war affects the homicide rate. We ignore any effect 
during civil war. It is likely that during civil war police records are incomplete, if only 
because part of the country is likely to be beyond official control. We therefore focus on 
the post-conflict period. We distinguish between the first five years after conflict, and the 
second five years.  
In Table 1, column 6 we introduce as a dummy variable the first five years post-conflict. 
Although the variable is positive, it is only significant at the 20% level. Before dismissing 
the post-conflict period as unimportant for the determination of the homicide rate, 
however, we investigate whether it changes the causal structure of the homicide rate. 
Specifically, we investigate whether it changes the effect of the four variables that are 
normally important in the determination of the homicide rate -the level of income, its rate 
of growth, the degree of income inequality, and the proportion of young men in the 
society. For this we introduce in turn interaction terms between each of these variables 
and the post-conflict dummy. Only in one case does the interaction approach statistical   10 
significance, names that with the degree of income inequality: this is on the borderline of 
significance at 10% and its inclusion has the effect of making the post-conflict dummy 
variable itself significant. It also has the effect of making GDP marginally insignificant. 
If GDP is dropped as a variable, both the post-conflict dummy and its interaction become 
significant, being borderline jointly significant. In order to attempt to adjudicate between 
the model of column 3, in which GDP is included but not the two post-conflict variables, 
and the model of column 9, in which the two post-conflict variables are included but not 
GDP, we perform a J-test, in which the predicted values from each regression are added 
to the rival regression (columns 10 and 11). There appears to be little to choose between 
the models, although the model of column 9 is marginally superior: the predicted values 
from that model are significant when added to the model of column 3, but not quite vice 
versa. None of the other interaction effects is sufficiently close to significance to be worth 
further consideration.  
Any post-conflict effects are thus statistically weak, although there appears to be 
something of a surge in the homicide rate in the early post-conflict period. The magnitude 
is fairly substantial at around 25%.
2 
  
The interaction of the post-conflict dummy with inequality is negative. The coefficient in 
absolute terms fully offsets the normally positive effects of inequality on the homicide 
rate. That is, although in early post-conflict situations the homicide rate is unusually high, 
and inequality is usually the main determinant of homicide, in the post-conflict phase it 
has no effect on homicide. Further, while the other usual influences on homicide do 
                                                    
2 The post-conflict homicide rate is 9.38 compared with an average homicide rate of about 7.   11 
continue to have effects in early post-conflict situations, they are no more potent than 
normal and so do not account for the surge in homicides.  
We next investigate whether the surge in homicides is persistent. For this we change the 
period of focus from the first five years post-conflict to the second five years (Table 1, 
columns 10 -15). The dummy variable for this period is completely insignificant, with or 
without interactions. The surge in the homicide rate thus completely fades away after 
around five years of post-conflict peace.  
What can we conclude from this pattern? The homicide rate probably surges in the early 
post-conflict years, but this is a problem which rapidly solves itself. Homicide in this 
short period is probably unrelated to inequality, normally the main determinant of 
homicide. There are several possible explanations of why this might happen. One legacy 
of civil war is a large stock of guns in the hands of the civilian population. However, 
were this to be the dominant explanation of the surge in homicides it might be expected 
that it would be fairly persistent. Guns can generally be expected to last longer than five 
years. For example, the surge in violence in South Africa may well be related to the 
ending of civil wars in neighbouring countries – with guns spilling over across the border, 
but this surge has to date been persistent. Further, there seems to be no reason why 
greater availability of guns would change the structure of homicide – making inequality 
unimportant – as opposed to simply increasing its incidence. A second possible 
explanation is that civil war leaves a legacy of scores to be settled across the society, and 
reduced inhibitions about settling them through violence. If this is the explanation, it is 
heartening that the effect fades so rapidly. A third possible explanation is that the surge in 
homicides may be related to demobilization. However, although we are unable to test for   12 
this explicitly, other evidence casts doubt on such a hypothesis. For example, Collier 
(1994) investigates the effects of the demobilization in Uganda on the crime rate by 
district, and finds that in most districts the effect was benign – demobilization actually 
reduced crime. A fourth possible explanation is that civil war leaves a legacy of drug 
addiction. Rebellions are sometimes linked to drugs partly as a way of raising finance – 
as with the FARC in Colombia, and partly as a method of controlling recruits - as with 
the RUF in Sierra Leone. Globally, there is a strong relationship between drug abuse and 
homicide. A fifth explanation relates to the way in which rebel organizations typically 
finance themselves during conflict. Because such organizations are specialized in 
violence, they have a natural advantage in running extortion rackets: their threats of 
violence have high credibility, as for example, with the FARC. In principle, the onset of 
peace deprives these organizations of their revenue from such rackets: organized violence 
is supposedly at an end. However, even if the leadership of the rebel organization has 
genuinely accepted peace terms, those who have benefited from the revenues generated 
by protection rackets have an interest in trying to sustain them. Yet as a result of peace 
they face a credibility problem: they need to demonstrate that their capacity for violence 
continues despite the peace. This analysis would predict just such a temporary upsurge in 
violence as we observe. The recent upsurge in ‘punishment’ violence by some IRA 
activists in Northern Ireland appears to fit this pattern. The upsurge should, however, be 
temporary, because once credibility has been re-established, the scale of violence can be 
reduced.   
The surge in homicides is not, on average, massive – during the first five years following 
a civil war it is around 25% higher than normal. However, in some situations a high rate   13 
of post-conflict homicide might be a serious problem, for example, it might be seen as 
destabilizing. In other work we have found that during this phase there is an abnormally 
high risk of a reversion to civil war (Collier et al. 2003). We therefore investigate 
whether, although the homicide rate is not normally a significant risk factor in the 
initiation of civil war, it might be so in the peculiar circumstances of the early post-
conflict phase. To test for this we need to introduce an interaction term of the dummy 
variable for the early post-conflict phase and the homicide rate into the core regression of 
the risk of civil war. First, however, we introduce the dummy variable on its own to 
ensure that any effect of the interaction term is not spuriously reflecting the direct 
significance of the dummy variable (Table 2, column 6). The dummy variable for the first 
five years of post-conflict is insignificant. We should note that this because the high risk 
during the early post-conflict phase is already well-captured in the core regression by a 
continuous variable which measures the number of months of peace. In Table 2, column 
7 we introduce the interaction term with the homicide rate. It is also completely 
insignificant. Hence, the surge in the homicide rate in the early post-conflict phase, 
though obviously a problem in itself, is not linked to the far larger problem of the high 
risk of a reversion to civil war.  
The implication of our analysis is that if the government wishes to reduce such violence, 
its most effective instruments among those we are able to measure are to accelerate 
economic growth and the establishment of democracy. Of course, in post-conflict 
situations other measures that we are unable to observe such as the re-establishment of 
effective policing, may be correlated with these variables and be the real source of   14 
influence. However, recall that although growth and democracy both reduce the homicide 




Homicide and civil war are two processes by which some people deliberately kill others 
in the same society. The homicide rate, being a continuous variable, is universally 
positive, whereas civil wars are rare except in low-income countries. However, where 
civil wars occur, the rate of deliberate killing is often on a scale fairly similar to 
homicide.
3 The most obvious reason to expect a difference between what determines the 
homicide rate and what determines the risk of civil war is that the latter requires large 
scale organization – a rebel group, armed and financed – whereas homicide is largely a 
small-scale crime. We have investigated whether the two processes have common causes. 
Contrary to the literature, we find that the economic fundamentals of homicide and civil 
war look similar. For both, killing is increased the lower is per capita income, the slower 
is the growth rate, and the larger are the financial resources of the potential ‘target’. The 
latter is, however, different for the two types of killing: homicide is increasing in the gap 
between the rich and the poor, whereas the risk of civil war is increasing in our proxy for 
natural resource rents. In both cases one possible interpretation is that killing has the 
objective of capturing financial resources – the assets of the rich, or natural resource 
rents. However, this apparent similarity may be entirely spurious. Much murder occurs 
among poor people, rather than being poor-on-rich violence: inequality could increase 
                                                    
3 The overall death rate from civil war generally dwarfs the scale of deaths from homicide, but this 
generally reflects the collateral damage of civil war to health systems and the flight of refugees.   15 
homicides simply because for a given per capita income it increases poverty. Similarly, 
the association between civil war and natural resource rents could be due to the 
deterioration in the quality of government commonly associated with them rather than by 
the lure of rent-capture to rebels. Beyond this ‘family resemblance’ the two processes 
have some striking differences. Remarkably, both the extent of democracy and the 
proportion of young men in the society, - factors often suggested as being important in 
civil war – appear to matter only for homicide.  
 
We have found a unidirectional causal relationship between the two processes. Homicide 
has no effect on the risk of civil war, but civil war temporarily raises the homicide rate. 
That the homicide rate has no effect on the risk of civil war is striking: it might be 
imagined that a society sensitized to a high level of violence is more likely to experience 
violent political challenges. This appears not to be the case. We have suggested that this 
may be because the ability to recruit a few hundred or a few thousand youths into a rebel 
army – which is all that is needed for a civil war – is unrelated to wider attitudes to 
violence across the society. Essentially, in many societies there may be a massive over-
supply of youths willing to kill for an organization. In the early post-conflict period – the  
first five years - the rate of homicide is significantly higher – by around 25% - as a result 
of the war. This does not persist – between the sixth and tenth post-conflict years there is 
no discernable effect. During this brief period of above-normal homicide, the factors 
accounting for homicide are also distinctive. Income inequality, - normally the most 
significant factor in the homicide rate – has no effect. Other influences – democracy, the 
level of income, the growth rate, and the proportion of the society made up of young   16 
males, are unchanged, but this leaves a large unexplained residual which appears to be a 
direct legacy effect of the war. Perhaps civil wars leave scores to be settled, and a 
willingness to resort to violence in order to do so. A potential concern of this brief phase 
of high personal violence is if it destabilizes the post-war peace, which is often fragile. 
We investigated this but did not find a significant effect of post-conflict violence on the 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Determinants of Civil War 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
ln GDP per capita  -0.950  -0.918  -0.951  -0.886  -2.024  -1.469 
  (0.245)***  (0.314)***  (0.247)***  (0.260)***  (0.813)**  (0.603)** 
GDP per capita  -0.098  -0.066  -0.097  -0.096  0.191  0.179 
growth t-1  (0.041)**  (0.054)  (0.042)**  (0.041)**  (0.171)  (0.131) 
primary 
commodity  
16.773  21.691  16.595  16.187  75.453  61.963 
exports/GDP  (5.206)***  (7.689)***  (5.245)***  (5.195)***  (38.044)**  (25.452)** 
primary 
commodity  
-23.800  -37.145  -23.573  -23.072  -207.396  -167.369 
exports/GDP
2  (10.040)**  (16.698)**  (10.055)**  (9.936)**  (122.378)*  (83.398)** 
social   -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
fractionalization  (0.000)***  (0.000)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*  (0.000)* 
ethnic  0.480  0.470  0.476  0.496  -0.463  1.577 
dominance  (0.328)  (0.396)  (0.328)  (0.328)  (0.884)  (0.755)** 
peace  -0.004  -0.003  -0.004  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)**  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.003)*  (0.002)** 
ln population  0.510  0.595  0.500  0.486  0.730  0.826 
  (0.128)***  (0.172)***  (0.134)***  (0.131)***  (0.502)  (0.379)** 
geographic  -0.992  -1.986  -0.985  -1.099  -3.304  -3.886 
concentration  (0.909)  (1.131)*  (0.914)  (0.918)  (2.894)  (2.082)* 
income    0.012         
inequality    (0.020)         
proportion of       3.762       
young men      (17.924)       
democracy        -0.029     
        (0.052)     
ln homicides (t-1)          0.046   
          (0.414)   
postconflict *            -3.507 
ln homicides            (4.445) 
Observations  750  517  743  714  253  319 
Pseudo R
2  0.22  0.18  0.22  0.22  0.44  0.40 
Notes: Logit estimates of war starts. The dependent variable indicates whether a war started in a particular 
five year sub-period. Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 





Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
 




750  0.069  0.254 
homicides 
(per 100,000 pop) 
319  6.999  10.827 
GDP per capita 
(in const 1990 US $) 
685  5672  8667 
GDP per capita growth 
  
684  1.50  3.37 
Income Inequality 
(Gini coefficient) 
517  41.35  10.21 
secondary schooling of young men 
(gross enrolment rates) 
688  44.49  30.97 
proportion of young men in the population 
 
743  0.129  0.012 
democracy 
(index 1-10) 
714  4.25  4.29 
population 
(in millions) 
750  30.6  111 
primary commodity exports/GDP 
 
750  0.155  0.140 
ethnic dominance 
(dummy) 
750  0.437  0.496 
post-conflict (first five years) 
(dummy) 
750  0.06  0.238 
post-conflict (second five years) 
(dummy) 
750  0.045  0.208 
social fractionalization 
(index 0-10,000) 
750  1813  1982 
peace since the end of the civil war 
(months) 
750  348  160 
geographic concentration of the population 
(index 0-1) 




Table A2: Homicide Rates for Selected Countries  
 
Country  Homicide Rates  
Average 1995-99 
Estimated Number of  
Homicides in 1995 
Argentina  4.78  1,700 
Bangladesh  2.51  3,000 
Canada  4.65  1,400 
China  2.10  25,000 
Ethiopia  13.42  7,600 
Mexico  13.51  12,400 
Pakistan  7.31  9,500 
Rwanda  43.39  2,800 
Thailand  7.80  4,600 
United Kingdom  3.82  2,240 
Venezuela  14.16  3,100 
Note: The estimated number of homicides in 1995 was obtained by applying  




The degree of openness of democratic institutions is measured on a scale of zero (low) 
to ten (high). Source: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/index.html. The data are 
described in Jaggers and Gurr (1995).  
 
Education  
We measure education as the average years of schooling in the adult population aged 
15 and over (source: Barro and Lee, 1996). 
 
Ethnic dominance 
Using the ethno-linguistic data from the original data source (Atlas Narodov Mira, 
1964) we calculated an indicator of ethnic dominance. This variable takes the value of 
one if one single ethno-linguistic group makes up 45 to 90 percent of the total 
population and zero otherwise. We would like to thank Tomila Lankina for the 
translation of the original data source. 
 
GDP per capita 
We measure income as real PPP adjusted GDP per capita. The primary data set is the 
Penn World Tables 5.6 (Summers and Heston, 1991). Since the data are only 
available from 1960-92 we used the growth rates of real PPP adjusted GDP per capita 
data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 1998 in order to obtain 
income data for the 1990s. These GDP per capita data were used to calculate the 
average annual growth rate over the previous five years. For Table 1 we used per 
capita income data in constant US dollars from the World Development Indicators 
2003. 
 
Geographic Concentration of the Population 
We constructed a dispersion index of the population on a country by country basis. 
Based on population data for 400km
2 cells we generated a Gini coefficient of 
population dispersion for each country. A value of 0 indicates that the population is 
evenly distributed across the country and a value of 1 indicates that the total 
population is concentrated in one area. Data is available for 1990 and 1995. For years 
prior to 1990 we used the 1990 data. We would like to thank Uwe Deichman of the 
World Bank’s Geographic Information System Unit for generating this data. He used 
the following data sources: Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network (CIESIN), Columbia University; International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI); and World Resources Institute (WRI). 2000. Gridded Population of 




Homicides are measured as homicide rates per 100,000 persons. Data for 1970-94 was 
obtained from FLL and we would like to thank the authors for their help with the data. 
We updated these homicide rates for 1995-99 using data from the World Health 
Organization, following the methodology as discussed in Begg and Tomijima (2001). 
We would like to thank Niels Tomijima for help with the data. Further observations 
were obtained from Interpol statistics. 
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Income Inequality 
Inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient of income inequality (source: Deininger 
and Squire, 1996). 
 
Peace Duration 
This variable measures the length of the peace period (in months) since the end of the 
previous civil war. For countries which never experienced a civil war we measure the 
peace period since the end of World War II. 
 
Population 
Population measures the total population, the data source is the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 1998.  
 
Primary commodity exports/GDP 
The ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP proxies the abundance of natural 
resources. The data on primary commodity exports and GDP were obtained from the 
World Bank. Export and GDP data are measured in current US d ollars.  
 
Social, ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization 
We proxy social fractionalization in a combined measure of ethnic and religious 
fractionalization. Ethnic fractionalization is measured by the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index. It measures the probability that two randomly drawn 
individuals from a given country do not speak the same language. Data are only 
available for 1960. In the economics literature this measure was first used by Mauro 
(1995). Using data from Barrett (1982) on religious affiliations we constructed an 
analogous religious fractionalization index. Following Barro (1997) we aggregated 
the various religious affiliations into nine categories: Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, 
Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, Eastern Religions (other than Buddhist), Indigenous Religions 
and no religious affiliation.  
 
The fractionalization indices range from zero to 100. A value of zero indicates that the 
society is completely homogenous whereas a value of 100 would characterize a 
completely heterogeneous society. 
 
We calculated our social fractionalization index as the product of the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and the religious fractionalization index plus the ethno-linguistic or 
the religious fractionalization index, whichever is the greater. By adding either index 
we avoid classifying a country as homogenous (a value of zero) if the country is 
ethnically homogenous but religiously divers, or vice versa. 
 
War Data 
A civil war is defined as an internal conflict in which at least 1,000 battle related 
deaths (civilian and military) occurred per year. We use mainly the data collected by 
Singer and Small (1992) and according to their definitions (Small and Singer, 1984) 
we updated their data set for 1992-99. 
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